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Baker v. Martin and the Constitutionality of Partisan
Qualifications for Appointment to District Courts
Independence and accountability are the "twin, if somewhat incom-
patible goals" of many state judicial systems.1 To realize these goals,
numerous states provide for the election of judges.' North Carolina is
one of these states that elects its judges,3 through the somewhat unique
process of partisan judicial elections.4 This selection process has gener-
ated considerable controversy and criticism, especially from members of
the judiciary,5 but it remains the law.
Closely related to the partisan judicial election process is the method
by which mid-term vacancies on the bench are filled. In 1981 the North
Carolina General Assembly enacted General Statutes section 7A-142,
which mandates that only persons of the same political party affiliation
as a vacating judge may fill vacancies in elected district court judgeships.6
Last year, in Baker v. Martin,7 the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
jected arguments that the party affiliation requirement is an unconstitu-
tional limitation on eligibility for elective office.8 Although the North
Carolina Constitution expressly delineates qualifications for elective of-
fice,9 the court held that these constitutional limitations are applicable
only to persons seeking election to office, and not to persons appointed to
vacancies.1o
This Note analyzes the holding in Baker and concludes that while
section 7A-142 pursues the worthy goal of protecting the electoral man-
date of North Carolina voters, the statute violates the state constitution.
1. Bradley C. Canon, Commentary on State Selection of Judges, 77 Ky. L.J. 747, 749
(1988-89).
2. By the late 1980s, 42 states elected some or all of their judges in partisan, nonpartisan,
or retention elections. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 163-65
(1988-89).
3. N.C. CONST. art. IV, §§ 9, 10, 16; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-10, -16, -140 (1989).
4. To be eligible to file as a candidate in a primary election, one must be a registered
member of the political party that holds the election. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-106(b) (1991).
5. Justice Webb, writing for the majority in Baker v. Martin, stated: "We may not like
this method and [there have been] efforts by members of this Court and others to move away
from political partisanship in the selection ofjudges." 330 N.C. 331, 341, 410 S.E.2d 887, 893
(1991).
6. Act of July 1, 1981, ch. 763, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1122, 1122 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-142 (1989)).
7. 330 N.C. 331, 410 S.E.2d 887 (1991).
8. Id. at 334-42, 410 S.E.2d at 889-93.
9. N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
10. Baker, 330 N.C. at 335-36, 410 S.E.2d at 889-90; see infra notes 19-27 and accompa-
nying text.
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If this statute is desirable, North Carolina should implement it by consti-
tutional amendment, not by judicial legislation.
The Honorable Philip Ginn, a Democratic district judge in the
twenty-fourth judicial district,11 resigned his office effective March 29,
1991.12 James L. Baker, a Republican assistant district attorney and a
resident of the twenty-fourth judicial district, sought the district bar's
nomination for Judge Ginn's seat. 3 Citing section 7A-142, the bar ex-
pressly refused to consider Baker as a replacement because of his affilia-
tion with the Republican Party.14 After Baker filed suit, the superior
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment."5 The case
came to the North Carolina Supreme Court on discretionary review prior
to consideration by the North Carolina Court of Appeals."
The supreme court, after establishing that the plaintiff had standing
to bring the case,"7 noted that although the court possesses the power to
review an act of the General Assembly, it was powerless to overturn the
statute unless it was manifestly unconstitutional. If any reasonable doubt
exists as to a statute's constitutionality, the judiciary will show great def-
erence to the legislature, and the statute will stand. 8 This presumption
11. The 24th judicial district encompasses Avery, Madison, Mitchell, Watauga, and Yan-
cey Counties. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-133 (1989).
12. Baker, 330 N.C. at 333, 410 S.E.2d at 888.
13. Id. State district judges are elected pursuant to Article IV, § 10 of the state constitu-
tion and General Statute § 7A-140. N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 10; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-140
(1989). Should a district judge die, retire, or otherwise vacate the office, the judicial district
bar submits nominations for a replacement to the Governor, who appoints someone to fill the
vacancy for the remainder of the elected term. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-142 (1989).
14. Baker, 330 N.C. at 333, 410 S.E.2d at 888. The governing statute states in part:
If the district court judge was elected as the nominee of a political party, then the
district bar shall submit to the Governor the names of three persons who are resi-
dents of the district court district who are duly authorized to practice law in the
district and who are members of the same political party as the vacating judge ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-142 (1989) (emphasis added).
15. Baker, 330 N.C. at 333, 410 S.E.2d at 888. Baker sought to have § 7A-142 declared
unconstitutional since it precluded him from consideration as a candidate for district court
judge, even though he satisfied the North Carolina Constitution's eligibility requirements for a
district court judgeship. Id. at 333-34, 410 S.E.2d at 888-89; see N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 22
("Only persons duly authorized to practice law in the courts of this State shall be eligible for
election or appointment as a ... Judge of District Court."); id. art. VI, § 6 ("Every qualified
voter in North Carolina who is 21 years of age, except as in this Constitution disqualified, shall
be eligible for election by the people to office.").
16. Baker, 330 N.C. at 332, 410 S.E.2d at 888; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1989).
17. The barring of the plaintiff from consideration due to his Republican Party affiliation
was sufficient injury to give him standing to sue. Baker, 330 N.C. at 333, 410 S.E.2d at 888.
18. Id. at 334, 410 S.E.2d at 889; accord State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438,
448, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989) ("[W]e will find acts of the legislature repugnant to the Consti-
tution only 'if the repugnance do [sic] really exist and is plain.' ") (quoting Hoke v. Henderson,
15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1, 9 (1833), overruled on other grounds by Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 46
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is crucial to the majority's holding, for it presents a difficult standard to
meet.
The majority's analysis of the merits began with a review of Article
VI, Section 6 of the North Carolina Constitution.19 The court observed
that while the section is entitled "Eligibility to elective office," 20 the text
of the section mentions only "eligibility 'for election by the people to
office.' "21 There is no mention of eligibility for appointment to office,
even though other provisions of the constitution clearly identify the pos-
sibility of election or appointment in certain circumstances.22 Thus, the
court stated, "the words 'by the people' . ..make it clear the section
refers to the process of election."' 23 As a result, the constitutional provi-
sion in no way covers these appointments to office.24
The supreme court next commented that a historical analysis of Ar-
ticle VI supports a narrow construction of the provision. Specifically, the
court noted that the earlier version of Article VI, Section 6 was entitled
"Eligibility to Office," and its text read: "Every voter in North Carolina,
except as in this article disqualified, shall be eligible to office .... ,2
Thus, 1971 amendments adding the word "elective" to the section's
heading and the qualification "for election by the people" to its text2"
represented a narrowing of the section's scope so that it subsequently
applied only to elections to office.27
The court found further support for its holding in other sections of
the constitution. Article IV, section 10, which governs the establishment
of district courts, provides that both the election of judges and the filling
of vacancies on the bench be conducted "in a manner prescribed by
S.E. 961 (1903)); Gardner v. Reidsville, 269 N.C. 581, 595, 153 S.E.2d 139, 150 (1967) (quot-
ing American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Gold, 249 N.C. 461, 463, 106 S.E.2d 875, 876
(1959)); McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 515, 119 S.E.2d 888, 892 (1961).
19. See supra note 15 for the text of this section.
20. N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
21. Baker, 330 N.C. at 335, 410 S.E.2d at 889 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 6).
22. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 19 ("If any person elected or appointed to any of these
offices shall fail to qualify") (emphasis added); N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 22 ("Only persons duly
authorized to practice law ... shall be eligible for election or appointment . . . .") (emphasis
added).
23. Baker, 330 N.C. at 335, 410 S.E.2d at 890. This argument is self-proving since "[a]
gubernatorial appointment requires no participation 'by the people.'" Id.
24. Id. at 336, 410 S.E.2d at 890.
25. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 7 (1900); Baker, 330 N.C. at 336, 410 S.E.2d at 890.
26. Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 1258, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1461, 1478. In 1969 the
General Assembly proposed a complete editorial revision of the North Carolina Constitution,
which was adopted by popular vote at the general election of November 3, 1970. The new
constitution took effect July 1, 1971. See Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 1258, § 4, 1969 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1461, 1484.
27. Baker, 330 N.C. at 336, 410 S.E.2d at 890.
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law."' 28 This phrase, the court decided, necessarily implies that the Gen-
eral Assembly has authority to codify the election procedures not enu-
merated in the constitution.29 Assuming the phrase applies similarly to
the appointment process, contended the court, the General Assembly
must play some role in the appointment of district judges, because Arti-
cle IV, section 19 does not establish all of the necessary procedures.30
General Statute section 7A-142, therefore, is a manifestation of that
role.31
The supreme court's final argument on behalf of section 7A-142 was
policy-oriented: The statute protects the electoral mandate of voters.32
Given that the voters in the twenty-fourth judicial district chose to elect
a Democrat, it was reasonable and fair to ensure that a Democrat filled
the seat for the duration of the elected term. To allow the Governor to
appoint a Republican or even an independent attorney to the bench
would subvert the electoral process. The majority all but admitted that it
"[does] not like" the partisan election of judges, but the court felt obli-
gated to support and protect the existing system from abuse.33
Justices Mitchell and Martin dissented,34 each citing Article VI,
28. N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 10. The plaintiff argued that Article IV, § 19 of the constitu-
tion, which establishes guidelines for filling vacancies in judicial offices, exclusively "prescribes
the manner in which district court judges are appointed." Baker, 330 N.C. at 340, 410 S.E.2d
at 893. This section does not contain a political party qualification; therefore, according to
prior supreme court holdings, it should be unconstitutional to add this qualification. d ; see
infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
29. Baker, 330 N.C. at 340-41, 410 S.E.2d at 893.
30. Id. at 341, 410 S.E.2d at 893.
31. See id. In dissent, Justice Martin's response to this argument was simple: Article IV,
§ 19 "is a clear, complete, and detailed manner of filling judicial vacancies for the office of
district judge. No implementing legislation is required; the General Assembly has no part to
play. . . ." Id. at 346-47, 410 S.E.2d at 895 (Martin, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 341, 410 S.E.2d at 893. The court cited Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic
Party, 457 U.S. 1, 13 (1982), to support its argument that protecting the electoral mandate is a
valid concern, but the court admitted that Rodriguez is of limited usefulness because it con-
cerns a federal constitutional issue and a legislative appointment, whereas Baker concerns a
state constitutional issue and a judicial appointment. Baker, 330 N.C. at 341, 410 S.E.2d at
893. Even the illustrative value of Rodriguez is minimal, however, because the Supreme Court
held that protecting the electoral mandate was important largely because Puerto Rico, the
jurisdiction involved, had a compelling interest in ensuring minority representation in its legis-
lature. Rodriguez, 457 U.S. at 13. Such interests are not implicated in Baker.
33. Baker, 330 N.C. at 341, 410 S.E.2d at 893. Justice Martin, however, aptly noted that
regardless of the rationality or benevolence of the General Assembly's goals, they may not be
achieved at the expense of the constitution. Id. at 346, 410 S.E.2d at 895 (Martin, J.,
dissenting).
34. Justice Mitchell authored a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Exum and Jus-
tice Martin joined, id. at 342, 410 S.E.2d at 895 (Mitchell, J., dissenting), and Justice Martin
authored a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Exum and Justice Mitchell joined. Id. at
344, 410 S.E.2d at 894 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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Section 8 of the state constitution, entitled "Disqualifications for of-
fice.""5 Justice Mitchell argued that under the doctrine of expressio unius
est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of an-
other), the integrated and comprehensive list of disqualifications con-
tained in section 8 precludes any other disqualifications.3 6 Justice
Mitchell noted that although this doctrine has never been applied to con-
stitutional interpretation in North Carolina, 7 the supreme court has
stated that "[q]uestions of constitutional construction are in the main
governed by the same general principles which control in ascertaining the
meaning of all written instruments. 3a
In a separate dissent, Justice Martin argued that the court could not
simply ignore the heading to a section of the state constitution,3 9 even if
there is a discrepancy between the scope of the heading and the text of
the section.' Furthermore, he argued, since the office of district court
judge is undoubtedly an elective office,41 the qualifications enumerated in
Article VI, Section 6 of the constitution apply whether a person is elected
35. Id. at 342, 410 S.E.2d at 896 (Mitchell, J., dissenting); id. at 345, 410 S.E.2d at 894
(Martin, J., dissenting). This section disqualifies three groups of candidates: 1) those who
deny the existence of God; 2) those who are "not qualified to vote in an election for that
office" which is filled by election; and 3) those who are convicted felons, who have been found
guilty of corruption or malpractice in any office, or who have been successfully impeached.
N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
36. Baker, 330 N.C. at 343, 410 S.E.2d at 896 (Mitchell, J., dissenting). For cases apply-
ing the doctrine, see Alberti v. Manufactured Homes, Inc., 329 N.C. 727, 732, 407 S.E.2d 819,
822 (1991); Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, 322 N.C. 271, 276-77, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658
(1988); Morrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 319 N.C. 298, 303, 354 S.E.2d 495, 498-99 (1987).
37. Baker, 330 N.C. at 343, 410 S.E.2d at 896 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
38. Perry v. Stancil, 237 N.C. 442, 444, 75 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1953). The majority in Baker
criticized Justice Mitchell's application of this doctrine to the constitution. Although it is a
widely acknowledged tool of statutory construction, North Carolina courts have never ex-
pressly applied it to the constitution. Baker, 330 N.C. at 337, 410 S.E.2d at 890-91. The
majority asserted that the dearth of case precedent is due to the doctrine's contradiction with
the long-accepted notion that the North Carolina Constitution limits, rather than grants,
power. Id. Thus, "[u]nless the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication restricts the
actions of the legislative branch, the General Assembly is free to implement legislation as long
as that legislation does not offend some specific constitutional provision." Id. at 338-39, 410
S.E.2d at 891-92. Because there is no express or necessarily implied constitutional restriction
on the state legislature to limit disqualifications to appointed office to those found in the consti-
tution, the court reasoned that the General Assembly may enact additional qualifications. Id.
at 339, 410 S.E.2d at 892. The majority added that adopting Mitchell's interpretation of Arti-
cle VI, § 8 would invalidate many appointive positions with partisan qualifications in all
branches of government, because that section applies to all branches, not merely the judiciary.
Id.
39. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that every provision of the state constitu-
tion is significant, and no part of it can be "disregarded, ignored, suspended, or broken in
whole or in part." State v. Patterson, 98 N.C. 660, 661, 4 S.E. 350, 350 (1887).
40. Baker, 330 N.C. at 345, 410 S.E.2d at 894 (Martin, J., dissenting).
41. See N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 10 ("District Judges shall be elected").
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or appointed to the bench.4 2 To interpret this constitutional provision
differently would permit the appointment of persons who would be con-
stitutionally ineligible for election to the same office. 3 "Surely," Justice
Martin stated, "this is contrary to the genius of the people in framing this
article of our Constitution."'  Both dissents argued that the supreme
court has long held that the General Assembly "cannot add to the dis-
qualifications from state office prescribed in the Constitution of North
Carolina."45 Justice Mitchell also noted that the disqualification of those
not authorized to practice law from election or appointment to the state
courts was accomplished only by amending the state constitution, not by
legislative acts.4 6 The goal of North Carolina General Statutes section
7A-142 was not inherently unconstitutional, but the means used to ac-
complish the goal were.
Prior to 1981, there was no partisan limitation on appointments to
district court vacancies. The provisions of section 7A-142 at issue in
Baker closed this political loophole.47 Other elective offices have similar
statutory limitations on the political party affiliations of people nomi-
nated to fill vacant seats. Most notably, vacancies in the North Carolina
General Assembly must be filled by someone from the same political
party as the vacating legislator.41 Significantly, however, there is no sim-
ilar requirement for judicial vacancies in either the superior courts, the
court of appeals, or the supreme court.49 Only at the district court level
does political partisanship play a role in filling judicial vacancies. Why
the General Assembly has not extended the requirements of section 7A-
42. Baker, 330 N.C. at 344-45, 410 S.E.2d at 894 (Martin, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 345, 410 S.E.2d at 894 (Martin, J., dissenting). The majority responded crypti-
cally to this theoretical possibility by quoting a dated case that ignored a similarly troubling
hypothetical situation. Id. at 342, 420 S.E.2d at 893-94 (quoting Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C.
588, 592, 77 S.E. 768, 769 (1913) ("The Constitution contains no prohibition, in terms, as to
this.")).
44. Baker, 330 N.C. at 345, 410 S.E.2d at 894 (Martin, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 343, 345, 410 S.E.2d at 894, 896 (Mitchell, J., and Martin, J., dissenting); see
infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
46. Baker, 330 N.C. at 343-44, 410 S.E.2d at 896 (Mitchell, J., dissenting); see N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 22 (adopted by vote of the people at the election held November 4, 1980).
State constitutional amendments may be proposed by a constitutional convention or by a
three-fifths majority of both houses of the General Assembly. Voters must then ratify the
proposed amendment. Id art. XIII, §§ 2-4.
47. Act of July 1, 1981, ch. 763, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1122, 1122 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-142 (1989)).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-11 (1991).
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-9 (1991). At these levels of the state court system, Article
IV, § 19, and Article VI, § 6 of the North Carolina Constitution govern the appointment pro-
cedure. See Appellant's Brief at 21, Baker (No. 246PA91).
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142 to other levels of the judicial system is unknown.5
The case for statutory regulation of appointments to judicial vacan-
cies is further complicated by modem editorial revisions of the North
Carolina Constitution. Between 1868 and 1900, Article VI, Section 4 of
the constitution provided: "Every voter, except as hereinafter provided,
shall be eligible to office.""1 Based on this language, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held in Lee v. Dunn 2 that the state legislature could not
impose additional qualifications for eligibility to any state office other
than those enumerated in the constitution. 3
The court echoed this holding roughly forty years later in a pair of
decisions. In Spruill v. Bateman,54 the court stated that "[t]he Legisla-
ture is... forbidden by the organic instrument [the North Carolina Con-
stitution] to disqualify any voter, not disqualified by that article, from
holding any office.""5 And in Cole v. Sanders, 6 the court wrote:
50. Appellant argued that this disparate treatment of the various courts is nothing more
that partisan political gamesmanship. Appellant's Brief at 21, Baker (No. 246PA91). North
Carolina is not alone in its use of political party affiliation as a qualification for appointment to
certain offices. Although no other state has a statute identical to § 7A-142, some states have
similar provisions. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. II, § 15 (appointing replacements to vacancies
in the legislature and in partisan county elective offices); OR. REV. STAT. § 236.100 (1991)
(limiting appointees to vacant partisan elective state offices to people of same political party).
Oregon elects its judges, with the exception of county judges, on non-partisan ballots. OR.
CONST. art. VII, § 1; OR. REV. STAT. § 254.135 (1991). Vacancies on the supreme court, the
court of appeals, and circuit courts are filled by gubernatorial appointments, with no political
party qualifications involved. OR. CONST. art. V, § 16. Oregon Revised Statute § 236. 100 thus
does not apply to most judicial offices, but it nevertheless provides a useful comparison to
North Carolina General Statute § 7A-142. The Oregon Attorney General has stated that the
Oregon statute might violate equal protection principles, 29 OR. ATr'Y GEN. REP. 113, 114
(1959), and more importantly for comparative purposes, that it might "unlawfully addD a
qualification for serving in a[n] ... office beyond that prescribed in the constitution." 37 OR.
Arr'y GEN. REP. 505, 507 (1975). In State ex rel. Powers v. Welch, 198 Or. 670, 259 P.2d
112 (1953), the Oregon Supreme Court held, just as North Carolina's has, that the state legisla-
ture cannot add qualifications for offices created by the constitution when the constitution
enumerates the qualifications for such offices. Id at 672-73, 259 P.2d at 114. While stopping
short of declaring Oregon Revised Statute § 236.100 unconstitutional, the Oregon Attorney
General did state that the state constitution and the Powers holding "raise[] a doubt covering
the validity" of the statute. 37 OR. ATT'Y GEN. REP. 505, 508 (1975).
51. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 4.
52. 73 N.C. 595 (1875). In Lee, the sheriff of Wake County refused to pay over previously
collected taxes, as required by statute. Id. at 596-97. Upon his re-election, the Wake County
Board of Commissioners refused to induct him. Id. The sheriff challenged the Board's action,
asserting that he was constitutionally qualified to serve, and that requiring the payment of the
taxes imposed an additional, unconstitutional qualification on him. Id.
53. Id. at 605. The court distinguished between "eligibility or qualifications for office,"
which are found in the constitution, and "assurances for the faithful discharge of the duties of
the office," such as the statute in question in this case. Id.
54. 162 N.C. 588, 77 S.E. 768 (1913). Spruill concerned the constitutionality of a statute
that required the recorder of court to be a licensed attorney. Id. at 589, 77 S.E. at 768.
55. Id. at 591, 77 S.E. at 769. The court added: "Whoever is entitled under our Constitu-
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The provision in the Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 7, that "Every
voter in North Carolina, except as in this article disqualified,
shall be eligible to office," was especially intended to prevent
any action by the Legislature disqualifying any voter from
holding office on account of race or color. The disqualifications
in that article provided are set out in section 8 thereof.... The
Legislature is disabled, therefore, to disqualify any other
"voter" from holding office. 7
The precedential value of Lee and its progeny is brought into ques-
tion, however, by the General Assembly's 1969 editorial revision of the
North Carolina Constitution. Adopted by the people in 1971, the revised
document added the word "elective" to the title of Article VI, Section 6
and the phrase "for election by the people" to the text of the provision:5
"Every qualified voter in North Carolina who is 21 years of age, except
as in this Constitution disqualified, shall be eligible for election by the
people to office." 59 Why these changes were made is unclear. The ma-
jority in Baker speculated that the amendment was intended to narrow
the scope of the section to apply only to the process of election.' °
The root of the dispute in Baker is an incongruity in the state consti-
tution. Two types of offices are discussed in the constitution: elective
tion to vote is entitled to hold office, except where restricted by that instrument. The constitu-
tional provision in these matters cannot be abridged by requiring any qualifications whatever
in addition to those set out in the Constitution." Id. at 593, 77 S.E. at 769. Article VI, § 4 of
the 1868 constitution was amended in 1901 to read: "Every voter in North Carolina, except as
in this article disqualified, shall be eligible to office." N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, § 7; see Act
of June 13, 1900, ch. 2, § 1, 1900 Public Laws 54, 56 (amended 1971).
56. 174 N.C. 112, 93 S.E. 476 (1917).
57. Id. at 114, 93 S.E. at 477 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
58. See Act of July 2, 1969, ch. 1258, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 1461, 1478.
59. N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
60. Baker, 330 N.C. at 336, 410 S.E.2d at 890. Prior to Baker, no North Carolina court
had considered the impact of the amendment. A 1972 North Carolina Attorney General's
opinion commented only that "[tihere is now no requirement in the Constitution that a person
holding a non-elective public office be a qualified voter .... Consequently, a deputy sheriff
who is appointed to his position need not be a resident of the county in which he is to serve."
41 N.C. AT'y GEN. REP. 754, 755 (1972). This opinion does not affect the holding in Baker,
because the post of deputy sheriff is a purely appointive position, whereas a district judgeship is
an elective office with the possibility of appointment to the bench.
The sole challenge to § 7A-142 occurred in 1987, when a situation nearly identical to that
in Baker arose. In Pearson v. Martin, 319 N.C. 449, 355 S.E.2d 496, disc. rev. denied, 319
N.C. 678, 356 S.E.2d 789 (1987), a Republican attorney sought to have § 7A-142 declared
unconstitutional solely to permit him to be considered as a candidate to replace a retiring
Democratic district judge. Id. at 451, 355 S.E.2d at 497. However, the plaintiff filed his com-
plaint four days after the district bar meeting in which he wished to participate had been held.
Id. at 451, 355 S.E.2d at 497. As a result, the court ruled the plaintiff's action moot. Id. at
451-52, 355 S.E.2d at 497-98. Thus, Baker v. Martin decided a question of first impression in
North Carolina.
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and appointive. 6 Prior to 1971, this lawsuit would never have arisen
because Article VI, Section 7 entitled "Eligibility to office," clearly cov-
ered both types of offices.62 Unfortunately, when the framers of the
amendment narrowed the scope of the section in 1971 to apply only to
elective offices, they overlooked the possibility of appointments to vacan-
cies in elective positions.
Despite this constitutional loophole, however, the office of district
judge remains indisputably an elective office.63 That someone may be
appointed to the bench under particular circumstances does not alter the
elective nature of the office itself. The fixed nature of elective judicial
office, in and of itself, proves very little. The supreme court has held,
however, that "when the Constitution prescribes and directs in terms, or
by necessary implication, that a particular power shall be exercised in a
specific way,.., such direction cannot be disregarded-a due observance
of it is essential."' Baker makes it possible for elected district judges
and appointed district judges to be subject to different qualifications.6"
This constitutional incongruity necessarily implies that Article VI, Sec-
tion 6 must apply uniformly to the elective office of district judge,
whether one is appointed or elected to the bench.
This result is supported by the decisions in Lee,66 Spruill,67 Cole,68
and Starbuck v. Havelock.69 The Baker majority's arguments notwith-
standing,70 each of these cases interpreted the "Eligibility to office" sec-
61. See, e.g., N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 19 ("If any person elected or appointed to any of
these offices"); id. § 22 ("eligible for election or appointment"); id. § 7 ("a person elected or
appointed to the office"); id. § 9 ("any combination of elective and appointive offices"). Appel-
lees in Baker relied exclusively on examples of appointive offices to justify the General Assem-
bly's ability to add qualifications beyond those enumerated in the constitution. Appellees'
Brief at 13, Baker (No. 246PA91). These examples are neither determinative nor illustrative,
for the office of district court judge is explicitly elective. See infra note 63 and accompanying
text.
62. See 41 N.C. Arr'y GEN. REP. 754, 755 (1972).
63. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 10 ("District Judges shall be elected").
64. State v. Patterson, 98 N.C. 660, 662 (1887) (emphasis added). The majority in Baker
likewise acknowledged this guideline. See Baker, 330 N.C. at 338-39, 410 S.E.2d at 892.
65. Baker, 330 N.C. at 345, 410 S.E.2d at 894 (Martin, J., dissenting).
66. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
69. 252 N.C. 176, 113 S.E.2d 278 (1960). Starbuck held, inter alia, that a statute that
required a nominee for mayor or the board of commissioners of a proposed municipality to
have resided in the area for at least one year violated Article VI, §§ 2 and 7 of the state
constitution. Id at 179, 113 S.E.2d at 280 ("The legislature was without power to so limit the
class which could qualify for office.").
70. The court argued that these cases concerned only elections to office, and thus were not
germane to the facts of Baker. 330 N.C. at 341, 410 S.E.2d at 893.
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tion of the constitution when it applied to all offices, not just elective ones
as Article VI, Section 6 does today. If article VI, section 6 applies to the
office of district judge, whether the judge is appointed or elected, the
proposition that additional disqualifications for office may not be added
to those enumerated in the constitution7 1 remains true.
Further, the reasoning behind this result is clear:
The General Assembly cannot render any "voter" ineligible for
office by exacting any additional qualifications ... any more
than it could prescribe that he should own a specified quantity
of property, or should be of a certain age, or race, or religious
belief, or possess any other qualification not required to make
him a voter.72
Requiring disqualifications from office to be enumerated in the constitu-
tion is thus a procedural safeguard for minority interests. The Spruill
court acknowledged the importance of this limitation: "The purpose of
[Article VI, Section 6] is well known by everyone. A newly emancipated
element [former slaves] had been admitted to suffrage, and it was rightly
anticipated that at some future day there might be a majority in the Gen-
eral Assembly unfavorable to their holding office .. . ,71 New reluc-
tances may have replaced those foreseen by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Spruill; one can certainly imagine members of the General As-
sembly being hostile towards members of the minority political party.
Qualification for office is a fundamental right closely linked to the right
to vote,74 and equal protection safeguards notwithstanding, it is impor-
tant to limit the General Assembly's power to disqualify someone or
some group from holding elective public office. This rationale applies
whether the public office is gained by election or appointment.
The Baker court's reliance on the history of Article VI, Section 6 of
the constitution is also misplaced.75 The majority cited the 1971 changes
71. "[T]here can be no disqualifications for office added by the Legislature as to offices
created by the Constitution." Cole v. Sanders, 174 N.C. 112, 116, 93 S.E. 476, 478 (1917)
(Clark, C.J., concurring).
72. Spruill v. Bateman, 162 N.C. 588, 591, 77 S.E. 768, 769 (1913). The supreme court
reemphasized the necessity of this constitutional safeguard in Cole:
It is very apparent that if the Legislature can prescribe that a part of the commission
must belong to the opposite political party; if it can take into consideration as qualifi-
cation, or disqualification, the political or religious or other views of candidates, it
can prescribe that all the members of the commission or candidates for any office,
even members of the Legislature, shall be of the same party, or of the same race, or of
the same church affiliations as the majority of the General Assembly.
174 N.C. at 115, 93 S.E. at 477 (Clark, C.J., concurring).
73. Spruill, 162 N.C. at 592, 77 S.E. at 769.
74. See N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
75. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
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in Article VI, Section 676 to buttress its interpretation. There is, how-
ever, no way to deduce the legislative intent behind the rewritten section.
All that is clear is that the section was indeed narrowed to deal with
elective offices. It is not clear that it was narrowed further to apply only
to the process of elections.
Other arguments of the Baker majority are similarly flawed. The
court based its rebuttal of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine
on the contention that the state constitution limits, rather than grants
power.7 7 Even if one assumes that the majority is correct on this point,
Article VI, Section 6 of the constitution acts expressly as a limitation of
power in that it qualifies all voters to hold elective office except as consti-
tutionally disqualified.78
The majority also explained that the inclusion of the phrase "in a
manner prescribed by law" in Article IV, Section 10 of the constitution
indicates that the General Assembly must play some further part in both
the elective and appointive processes; Article IV, Section 19 cannot be
the sole guideline for judicial appointments.79 Even if this interpretation
of the constitution is correct, however, and further implementing legisla-
tion in needed, such legislation should be procedurally oriented and not
concerned with the constitutional matter of disqualifications from office.
The majority assumes that any legislative action would be warranted
under its interpretation of Article IV, but this interpretation opens the
door for further constitutional violations.8 0
Although the majority and the dissents wrangle principally over
constitutional semantics, the issue in Baker has significant practical im-
plications as well. As suggested by the majority, a broad interpretation
of Article VI, Section 6 could be construed to invalidate existing party-
affiliation restrictions on appointments to vacancies in certain nonjudicial
offices.8 Arguably, however, judicial office is significantly different from
positions in the state's legislative and executive branches and thus war-
76. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 38.
78. N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 6 ("except as in this Constitution disqualified").
79. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
80. The imposition of additional qualifications for office, beyond those enumerated in the
constitution, clearly constitutes a constitutional violation. See supra notes 52-57 and accompa-
nying text. While it is difficult to imagine the General Assembly instituting a race-, gender-, or
wealth-based qualification on eligibility to office, other subtler limitations, such as the one
validated in Baker, remain a distinct possibility.
81. Invalidating existing restrictions would affect replacements for vacancies in the Gen-
eral Assembly and on numerous state licensing boards. Baker, 330 N.C. at 339-40, 410 S.E.2d
at 892.
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rants different constitutional treatment.8 2 Further, even if all offices are
considered similar in nature, to justify the majority's holding in Baker by
arguing that it avoids invalidating other equally unconstitutional statutes
would be to allow the General Assembly to avoid the constraints of the
constitution for the sake of convenience. The court should not decide
constitutional issues on the basis of whether its holding would inconven-
ience the legislature by invalidating a number of laws.
Finally, although party-alffliation restrictions arguably protect the
electoral mandate of voters, 3 protecting the mandate of the people in a
judicial election provides no overwhelming justification for Baker's deci-
sion because judges are supposed to be non-partisan.84 As a federal dis-
trict court stated: "Manifestly, judges... are not representatives in the
same sense as are legislators or the executive. Their function is to admin-
ister the law, not to espouse the cause of a particular constituency. "85
Thus, the majority cannot utilize public policy reasons to justify its tenu-
ous constitutional interpretation.
Further, as Justice Martin appropriately argued in his dissent, the
pursuit of even a worthy goal cannot be at the expense of the constitu-
tion.8 6 As noted by Justice Mitchell, an appropriate analogy can be
drawn between General Statute section 7A-142 and Article IV, Section
22 of the constitution, which disqualifies those not authorized to practice
law from election or appointment to state courts:8 7 "[T]he people of
North Carolina... recognized that they could add such [a] disqualifica-
tion only by an amendment to the Constitution of North Carolina.
8
By upholding the constitutionality of General Statute section 7A-
142 in Baker, the North Carolina Supreme Court protected the electoral
mandate of North Carolina voters, but it also judicially legislated a con-
stitutional amendment. The proper recourse for the General Assembly
would be to propose the contested portion of section 7A-142 as a consti-
tutional amendment and submit it to the voters of North Carolina. If
approved, it would become a constitutionally enumerated disqualification
and would avoid conflict with Article VI, Section 6.
82. See Appellees' Brief at 17-19, Baker (No. 246PA91).
83. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
84. The United States Supreme Court has rejected the one-person, one-vote rationale for
judicial elections. See Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455 (M.D. La. 1972) (noting that
judges serve people but do not represent them), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973).
85. Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964).
86. Baker, 330 N.C. at 346, 410 S.E.2d at 895 (Martin, J., dissenting).
87. N.C. CONsT. art. IV, § 22.
88. Baker, 330 N.C. 331, 343-44, 410 S.E.2d 887, 896 (1991) (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
See also N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 2 (constitution may be amended only in enumerated manner,
and in "no other way").
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Both the majority and the dissents in Baker make compelling argu-
ments for their respective interpretations, but the dissents' are based
more soundly in precedent and logic. The presumption of constitutional-
ity asserted by the majority is overcome in this case. The majority's in-
terpretation of the constitution would allow people not constitutionally
qualified to be elected to an office to be appointed to that same office.
This illogical result clearly demonstrates that the portion of section 7A-
142 in question is unconstitutional. It has taken twenty years for this
ambiguity in Article VI, Section 6 to come to light, and now that it has it
should be addressed on the constitutional rather than the statutory level.
By upholding the constitutionality of section 7A-142 in Baker v. Martin,
the North Carolina Supreme Court protected the electoral mandate of
North Carolina voters, but the constitutional ambiguity which spawned
this dispute remains essentially unanswered.
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